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Abstract Addiction appears to be a deeply moralized
concept. To understand the entwinement of addiction and
morality, we briefly discuss the disease model and its
alternatives in order to address the following questions: Is
the disease model the only path towards a ‘de-moralized’
discourse of addiction? While it is tempting to think that
medical language surrounding addiction provides libera-
tion from the moralized language, evidence suggests that
this is not necessarily the case. On the other hand non-
disease models of addiction may seem to resuscitate prob-
lematic forms of the moralization of addiction, including,
invoking blame, shame, and the wholesale rejection of
addicts as people who have deep character flaws, while
ignoring the complex biological and social context of
addiction. This is also not necessarily the case. We argue
that a deficit in reasons responsiveness as basis for attribu-
tion of moral responsibility can be realized by multiple
different causes, disease being one, but it also seems likely
that alternative accounts of addiction as developed by
Flanagan, Lewis, andLevy,may also involvemechanisms,
psychological, social, and neurobiological that can
diminish reasons responsiveness. It thus seems to us that
nondisease models of addiction do not necessarily involve
moralization. Hence, a non-stigmatizing approach to re-
covery can be realized inways that are consistent with both
the disease model and alternative models of addiction.
Keywords Addiction .Moralization .Moral
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Introduction: Changing Models of Addiction
Despite the rich debate on a proper understanding of
addiction, much of the oftentimes heated scholarly de-
bate in numerous fields (medicine, psychology, philos-
ophy) centers on whether addiction is a disease, i.e. a
pathological compulsion the concerned cannot resist, or
whether it is a matter of choice, i.e. a matter of willpower
and self-control. The disease model of addiction taken
broadly characterizes addiction as Bsevere, chronic stage
of substance-use disorder, in which there is a substantial
loss of self-control, as indicated by compulsive drug
taking despite the desire to stop taking the drugB [1; p.
364]. With a further focus on addiction as a brain dis-
ease, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA),
characterizes addiction as
… a chronic, relapsing brain disease that is char-
acterized by compulsive drug seeking and use,
despite harmful consequences. It is considered a
brain disease because drugs change the brain –
they change its structure and how it works. These
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brain changes can be long lasting, and can lead to
the harmful behaviors seen in people who abuse
drugs [2 : p. 5]
Widely endorsed perspectives on addiction that fol-
low the disease-model have held that addictive behavior
is a compulsion – beyond one’s conscious control and
without regard for one’s rational judgment – to indulge
in particular behaviors or in the consumption of certain
drugs [3, 4]. As even Lewis with a strong opposing
perspective on the disease model recognizes [5#],
Bbecause addiction compromises our physical and men-
tal health, and because it cannot be easily controlled, it
seems like a disease^ [p.##]. Those in support of addic-
tion as a compulsion or chronic disease often point to the
demonstrated role of genetic or neurophysiological fac-
tors in addiction, popularizing the notion of addiction as
Bhijacking the brain^.
Neuroscience and animal models of addiction have
been particularly influential in this characterization.
Identification of the neural pathways and circuits in-
volved in addiction, particularly the mesolimbic reward
system, and the ways in which the brains of addicted
persons are similar and change in predictable ways is
taken as significant evidence in favor of the disease
model [4]. More evidence comes from the possibility
to treat addiction through the use of pharmaceuticals to
ease withdrawal and prevent relapses in drug and alco-
hol addiction [6]. Evidence also comes from animal
research that shows rats and mice can become addicted
to a variety of substances through repeated use and will
engage in self destructive behaviors to access the sub-
stance [7, 8].
However, there are several challenges to the disease
model of addiction and the subsequent compulsion thesis
that follows from it. People who suffer from an addiction
often refrain from engaging in addictive behavior for
periods; and further, their addiction often requires an
elaborate series of actions, which cannot all be compelled
[9]. Some therefore argue that addiction is voluntary, a
Bdisorder of choiceB [e.g. 10]. Addiction, like many basic
choices that people make, is influenced by preferences
and goals. The relief, if not pleasure, that is derived from
satisfying one’s addiction could be understood as a ratio-
nal choice. Moreover, Heyman [10] points out that avail-
able survey data indicate that most addicted persons
eventually quit their addiction - data that is inconsistent
with the chronic disease model [11]. Large-scale epide-
miological studies show high percentages of spontaneous
recovery, even without specific treatment [12; p. 169; 13,
14]. Stephen Morse illustrates this nicely:
The ability of many addicts to decide to quit and to
be responsive to contingencies generally is an
inconvenient fact for those who wish to concep-
tualize addiction as purely a brain disease. People
do not stop being diabetics, for example, simply
by deciding that their pancreases should produce
more natural insulin nor does cancer abate because
people have good reason to be free of this terrible
disease [12; p. 169].
Finally, and perhaps most influentially, is a critique
taken up by Marc Lewis [5]. While advocates of the
disease model point to substantial changes in the brain
that come with addiction, critics point out that the brain’s
very nature is to change rather than remaining static.
Changes to the brain do not necessarily indicate a disease
process. Nor does the disease model alone seem to be an
accurate depiction of the phenomenology/1st person ac-
counts of addiction. Instead, there is evidence for a
shifting role of pleasure in different stages of addiction,
which at least suggests that someone suffering from
addiction can be responsive to a variety of contingencies
[15]. Notably, the models and the dominant discourses
influence addicted persons’ reflections on the addict^s
interior experience [16, 17]. Critics charge that a conse-
quence of the disease model is that calling it a disease
stigmatizes addicted persons, prevents them from devel-
oping self-control, and damages self-esteem.
The choice model, however, in turn does not remain
without criticism, since there is evidence from cognitive
neuroscience that the mechanisms involved in addiction
are different from those engaged in ordinary choice.
And choice does not adequately explain why addiction
is a Bchronic relapsing condition^, as it is often dubbed
by health authorities [9]. Marc Lewis, in his The Biology
of Desire [8] as well as in this volume [5] demonstrates
how one can conceive of addiction as related to signif-
icant brain changes and at the same time understand
how addiction is Bmotivated repetition that gives rise to
deep learning^ [5]. This ultimately allows for attributing
self-control and the capacity to learn otherwise to those
who previously learned addictive habits. Lewis and
other critics of the disease model address worries that
alternative models will blame addicts, thrust unwarrant-
ed moral responsibility on them, and remoralize
addiction.
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Does the Rejection of the Disease Model Risk
the (Re-) Moralization of Addiction?
Instead of arguing whether addicted persons can make
volitional choices or are out of control, and whether they
are to be held responsible for their addiction and/or for
their actions, in this article, we would like to focus on a
different set of questions: We would like to shed light on
the relation between addiction and moralization. Moral-
ity and addiction are often entwined. We investigate
which factors of the different models foster or hinder
moralization. What role does our understanding of mor-
al responsibility play for moralization of addiction?
What is the reason that addictions come to be treated
as matters of morality, subject to moral evaluation,
responsibility, and blame? What are the consequences
of the moralization of addiction?
Moralization –What Do We Mean by It and Why Does
It Matter?
The past two centuries of the history of Western devel-
oped countries public health efforts are rife with exam-
ples of the process of moralization (and de-moraliza-
tion). Cigarette smoking, the consumption of high fat
foods, becoming obese, entering environments rich with
infectious microbes (as in pregnant woman travelling to
a Zika infected country or an elder care provider failing
to get a flu shot and going into a school during flu
season) have all at one point in recent history shifted
from being merely individual preferences to taking on
not only a negative valence when it comes to health, but
a further negative moral connotation as well [19–23].
Moralization refers to conversion of a preference
into a value, within a culture and in individual
lives. It is hypothesized that values, because of
associated moral meanings are more likely to
produce internalization than instrumental con-
cerns such as health risks. Specifically, it is
predicted that liking for and disgust towards
a substance or activity will be more extreme if the
substance or activity is treated as a value (is mor-
alized) [24; p. 321].
We would like to specify this definition by focusing
on moral values, as opposed to economic or aesthetic
values (although they are often related). In principle,
moralization need not always associate behaviors or
preferences with negative moral meanings. Something
like exercising regularly to maintain cardiovascular
health can be moralized in the sense that a person who
does this can be understood as engaging in more than a
health promoting behavior, but also a virtuous or dutiful
behavior or lifestyle as well. In the majority of cases
discussed however, when something becomes moral-
ized, it takes on a negative moral meaning. Most often,
moralization also involves a shift in focus to the indi-
vidual as the problem, not the phenomenon itself, nor
the social context.
It is necessary here to distinguish moralization in the
sense we are using it, which involves attributing moral
weight or significance to some act or practice, from a
related but distinct use of moralization or moralize as-
sociated with self-righteous judgmentalism.1 People
who constantly and wrongly attempt to turn trivial mat-
ters into ones apparently involving morally significant
features are engaged in this kind of moralism.
We would like to stress another important distinction:
Whether or not a practice becomes moralized is an
empirical, psychological, anthropological, and sociolog-
ical issue. We are interested in the normative question;
that is, whether or not something should be moralized,
which matters for several reasons
First, it may cause a shift in focus from social and
economic causes of disease or other kinds of problems
to a focus on individual responsibility exclusively.2
Deborah Lupton has pointed out the way in which
self-tracking technologies encourage this perspective,
encouraging certain health problems to Bbecome repre-
sented primarily as failures of individual self-control or
efficiency, and therefore as requiring greater or more
effective efforts, including perhaps increased intensity
of self-tracking regimens, to produce a ‘better self.’^[26;
p. 7]. The upshot of this can mean different kinds of
policies, levels of social tolerance, and distribution of
resources in ways, which may be unjust.
Secondly, moralization is a significant phenomenon
from the perspective of normative ethics – not only from
sociology, public health, etc. In fact it is at the heart of
one of the most fascinating parts of human moral and
ethical practice. We have an ability to pick out a certain
1 Thank you to our anonymous reviewer for suggesting we clarify this
point.
2 Elsewhere, one of the authors has discussed some of the conse-
quences of such a shift of focus on perceived responsibility [25].
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phenomenon, behavior, or traits as morally relevant and
others as not so. Without a very long and complicated
story: the color of socks that one chooses to wear in the
morning is taken to be a morally neutral decision. But a
decision about whether or not to give one’s child break-
fast or let it leave the house hungry is usually taken to be
a morally fraught decision, whatever the mitigating
circumstances might be. In this case, moralization of
an activity is closely related to the extent to which a
person should be held morally responsible for their
condition. So it matters to the extent that we want to
make attributions of moral responsibility only when
they are justified. Moralization matters if we care about
consequences of attributing moral responsibility regard-
less of whether the attribution is justified or not.
Consider the recent modern history of western soci-
etal views on homosexuality: once considered immoral,
then as a disease, the moral implications shifted. Nota-
bly, in this case, the negative moral patina remained (at
least for some) despite the medicalization. With the
process of de-medicalization, moral attitudes might be
influenced as well. Examples of other cases in which
new scientific insights on the health consequences of a
behavior lead to moralization include cigarette smoking,
and obesity and healthy eating [23, 27, 28,]. Rozin [29]
describes the history of societal attitudes toward ciga-
rette smoking as the Bquintessential example^ of mor-
alization. In many Western countries, cigarette smoking
has changed over the past 50 years from a preference to
a moral violation, as its health effects became better
known. Cigarette smoking has now become moralized
to such an extent that disgust reactions towards smoking
correlate more highly with negative moral judgments of
smoking than do the negative perceptions regarding
health risks [24].
Does the Disease Model Reduce the Entanglement
of Moralization and Addiction?
Addiction appears to be a deeply moralized concept.
Addiction is as much understood to be about physiolog-
ical and psychological processes, just as it invokes mor-
al discourse. The position towards it can involve con-
demnation of supposed excess, in the USA in the 1970s
it lead to the disputed Bwar on drugsB.
We are interested in examining the ways in which
addiction (specifically substance abuse addictions) may
become increasingly moralized (again) as a result of
challenges to the brain disease model of addiction.
Importantly, we ask whether or not moralization is an
inevitable with the rejection and replacement of the
brain disease model and whether or not this is a morally
desirable consequence. It seems that once a condition is
conceived of as a medical condition, its part in the moral
discourse lessens or at least changes significantly. Once
addiction is understood as a brain disease, questions
about right- or wrong-doing seem to be ill-posed. As
soon as something is pathological, the main concern is
about how to cure it. The moral questions that do remain
regard the extent to which we should invest scarce
medical resources in its treatment and prevention, for
example. Moral issues arise with many illnesses. Con-
sequently, one needs to ask if one criticizes the disease
model, and proposes a model where either choice or
learning play a central role, does that automatically lead
to moralization of addiction?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of mor-
alization of addiction? What effect is this likely to have
on the way we conceive of individual and social respon-
sibility, blame, autonomy, justice, and on views of the
good life in both the public and the private sphere?
Is the disease model the only path towards a ‘de-
moralized’ discourse of addiction? It is tempting to think
that medical language surrounding addiction provides
liberation from the moralized language. But this is not
necessarily the case. The disease model of addiction has
not silenced the moralized discourse. At least it seems to
be clear that the story is not that simple: Moralization of
addiction did not vanish after addiction became widely
discussed in terms of disease. This is evident in the
many biases and negative social and health-related con-
sequences that addicted persons continue to face. These
are harms that result, not directly as a result of their
behavior or substance consumption, but as a byproduct
of how other people marginalize them or treat them
differently. Moreover, it might be that the disease model
invites its own forms of moralization: The conception of
addiction as a disease, suggesting that people cannot
take control of it, might invite morally laden perspec-
tives and possibly stigmatization on it, exactly because it
is understood as a disease [30].
The Dangers of Moralization
What can explain the fact that despite the official dom-
inance of the disease model of addiction, addiction
remains moralized in many ways? One possibility is
that we can simultaneously hold two contradictory
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attitudes about addiction at the same time or may hold
that addiction is a combination of a disease and a moral
failing, or perhaps even a disease caused by a moral
failing. But there are other explanations as well. Other
factors, such as social marginalization of certain groups
of addicts (especially users of hard drugs) [31–33] and
the mere fact that addictions have harmful effects (re-
gardless of whether there is volitional choice involved)
are likely having a role as well. In some contexts the
extent to which certain types of addiction are moralized
and stigmatized is connected to race. Reeves and Camp-
bell [34] discuss this phenomenon in their work onmedia
depictions in the United States of users of smoked co-
caine, so-called crack, associated with African American
users and powdered cocaine, associated with white users.
Empirical studies of the social perception of addictive
disease are rare. Shaffer [35] found a distinction be-
tween the perception of biological (amongst others de-
scribed as tuberculosis, coronary thrombosis, asthma)
and behavioral disorders (amongst others described as
cocaine abuse, heroine dependence, alcohol abuse, ad-
diction). A recent review on stigma and marginalization
related to psychoactive substance use [36] found ongo-
ing social disapproval, and there is evidence for a stron-
ger desire for social distance towards alcohol dependent
persons than towards those with psychiatric diagnoses
as depression or schizophrenia [37].
It is not only the general public that has negative
moral feelings towards addicted persons. There is wide-
spread evidence that health care providers share these
biases - resulting in care that is either deficient, lacking
in caring attitude, or involves extensive judgment. The
phenomena of physician biases, distancing, and reluc-
tance to treat, certain groups of people has been studied
extensively, including people who are obese, have men-
tal health disorders, substance abuse disorders, and eat-
ing disorders [38]. Research comparing the attitudes of
the general public and physicians to alcohol addiction
found that these two groups did not display distinct
stigmatizing attitudes on alcohol addiction, in fact; B2
out of 3 people in both groups have negative attitudes
towards alcohol addicts and medical education did not
change these attitudes^ [39] Medical students, for ex-
ample, display clear preferences for particular categories
of patients, and were less sympathetic toward those
whom they believed to be undeserving of treatment
because they were responsible for their condition, for
example people with eating disorders [40] and the obese
[41, 42].
Recent evidence suggests that the way we talk about
addiction matters. Language that treats it as a disease or
a moral failing has a significant impact on health care
providers’ attitudes towards those patients [43] Physi-
cians were given vignettes about a patient. There were
two versions of the vignette, one in which the patient is
described as a Bsubstance abuser^ and in the other as
Bsomeone with a ‘substance use disorder’.^ When par-
ticipants received the vignette describing the patient as a
substance abuser their moral evaluations of the patient
changed- they Bwere more likely to agree with state-
ments that he was to blame for his problem and should
be punished for not adhering to the court-ordered treat-
ment program, when compared with respondents whose
surveys described him as someone with a substance
abuse disorder^ [44].
There is extensive evidence that shows that when
physicians hold beliefs about addiction that moralize
the condition or stigmatize the addict, this seems to
create several barriers to getting sufficient care from
health care providers [45–50]. When patients perceive
this attitude they are less likely to be open and honest
about their habits and perhaps will avoid seeking care
altogether. Physicians with these kinds of negative atti-
tudes may also fail to address substance abuse issues
with their patients altogether because of personal dis-
comfort. The data supports the idea that public and
professional perceptions maintain the view that addic-
tion results from personal choice and immoral values,
conceiving of addiction as different from biologically
based diseases, despite their perception of it as a disease.
Alternatives to the Disease Model
and their Treatment of Moralization and Moral
Responsibility: Owen Flanagan, Marc Lewis,
and Neil Levy
The above findings can in part support the normative
claim that further moralization of addiction is undesir-
able when aiming to provide help to people who are
suffering from it. We now turn to the question of wheth-
er or not alternatives to the disease model of addiction
necessarily involve further moralization of addiction.
The philosophical literature on moralization as such,
and specifically on moralization of addiction related to
alternatives to the disease model is limited. Therefore,
we discuss the thoughts of three critics of the disease
model, who propose alternative views, and explicitly
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address this issue. The following is not meant to provide
a complete discussion of addiction and moral responsi-
bility, which would be far beyond the scope of this paper
[See 59]. Rather, we seek to illustrate the ambiguity in
whether or not alternative models of addiction involve
re-moralization.
Owen Flanagan’s Twin Normative Failure Model, Marc
Lewis’s Habit and Deep Learning Model, and Neil
Levy’s Defect of Agency Model
Owen Flanagan theorizes addiction as a Btwin norma-
tive failure.B By this he means that:
A failure of normal rational effective agency or
self-control with respect to the substance; and
shame at both this failure, and the failure to live
up to the standards for a good life that the addict
himself acknowledges and aspires to [51; p. 1].
Flanagan’s brief dismissal of the re-moralization objec-
tion cannot be viewed in isolation from his views on
addiction and moral responsibility. In an elaboration enti-
tled BResponsibility without the sting^, he relies on
Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes and objective
attitudes, where reactive attitudes are reactions based upon
an interpretation of conduct, manifested in actions and
attitudes, and objective attitudes are those seeing others
as objects of a handling, as subjects for treatment, not as
freely acting moral agents. Flanagan tentatively claims we
should suspend reactive attitudes toward addicted persons,
and addicted persons should suspend them when they
reflect on themselves [51; p. 7]. He argues we are justified
in reacting to them in a way similar to the way we react to
people Bwho have no rational control over their actions^ -
children or the Binsane^ as he puts it. But, crucially, he is
not arguing that addicted persons have no rational control
over their behavior. Although this suspension of the reac-
tive attitudes is difficult to assume with regard to addicted
persons, he is optimistic that:
The more we learn about the complex socio-
psycho-biological nature of addiction, about the
ways various cultures encourage heavy drinking,
about the effects of SES and drug availability
about genetic propensities, about the effects of
weird reinforcement regimens, and of brain
glitches, we have reason to adjust full normal
subjective engagement to the addict [ibid; p. 7].
Flanagan also directly responds to the criticism that
his account of addiction is a way of Bre-moralizing.^ It is
appropriate that the addict feels shame, he argues, be-
cause they are reflecting on their inability to act as Ban
effective agent in relation to the Substance^ [ibid; 10].
He concludes that, we should Baccept that addiction just
is a normative disorder, while at the same time not
moralizing it^ [ibid].
These are, however, very limited responses to theworry
about re-moralization. If, as he recommends, we should
take the objective attitude towards addicted persons and
suspend the reactive attitudes it is important to be very
clear about whywe should do so. In the cases of the insane
and children we do this because, as he says, we believe
they are not in control of their actions. But this is precisely
one of the elements of the disease model of addiction that
Flanagan wishes to challenge with his normative failing
model that characterizes addiction as a choice. Hence, this
cannot be the reason. We are left with the possibility that
addiction, although a choice, is a condition where there is
mitigated responsibility to some extent.
Alternatively, it could be that in cases of addiction
there are other mitigating reasons that make addiction
excusable. That is, even though the addicted persons are
responsible, and feelings of shame are warranted, they
are not truly blameworthy. This seems to be what Flan-
agan is suggesting when he says that as we learn more
about the nature of addiction and its complex causal
trajectory, we may mitigate the extent to which we
morally engage with the addict in the same way we do
with non-addicted persons. In order to flesh this out,
Flanagan (or someone else) needs to give an account of
what the excusing reasons are in the case of addiction-
reasons that are consistent with his model.
In another challenge to the disease model, Neil Levy
argues that instead of a brain disease, addiction is better
understood as a Bdisorder of belief^ [52]. Levy is ex-
plicitly interested in issues of moral responsibility and
by association the moralization of addiction [58]. He
offers a complex picture of the causes of addiction and
its maintenance putting strong emphasis on the Bsocial
conditions^ outside of the individual addicted person’s
control that contribute to their state.
Addiction is not a brain disease, but there is a good
case for saying that it is, nevertheless, a disorder
which may require treatment (which may be medi-
cal or psychiatric, though other kinds of treatment
may be appropriate in addition or instead), for
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which the sufferer is not to blame and the sufferer
from which is an appropriate recipient of compas-
sion [53; p.6]
Levy also rejects the Bcrass moralism^ of the pre-
disease model days in addiction science, where the
addict was blamed, ostracized, and isolated. He argues
that a rejection of the brain disease model does not mean
we return to this. Instead, a view of addiction that takes
social circumstances into much greater account may
have the opposite effect: society, professionals and or-
ganizations who think about addiction will have to take
into account a much wider range of factors than simply
brain dysfunction when considering the causes, preven-
tives, and solutions for addiction.
For Marc Lewis, addiction is neither a disease nor a
voluntary choice. Instead he characterizes it as
…a habit that grows and self-perpetuates relatively
quickly, when we repeatedly pursue the same high-
ly attractive goal. Or, in a phrase, motivated repe-
tition that gives rise to deep learning [18; p. 174].
Lewis pays attention to the neuroscientific evidence
regarding brain changes that come with addiction and
argues that if we take changes to Bthe wiring of the
striatum (and related regions)^ and adjustments in Bthe
flow and uptake of dopamine^ to be evidence of a
disease in the case of addiction, then we also should
count the habits that lead us to repeatedly seek reward-
ing experiences, like meeting a lover, as disease pro-
cesses because they involve the same structural and
functional changes [18]. The process of becoming
addicted can be described as a process of deep learning
that is fuelled by desire and becomes a habit [18].
Like Flanagan and Levy, Lewis is aware of the worry
that rejection of the disease model of addiction might be
an expression of or will result in further stigmatization of
addicted persons and an attitude that we as a society
should leave them to their own devices, because it is not
as if they have a Breal disease^ like cancer or diabetes.
Importantly, he states that BI’m not arguing that addictive
behaviors are fuelled by voluntary choice^ [5]. The key
here is the notion of voluntary. Lewis argues that it is
perfectly consistent to say that addiction is fueled by desire
and choice, but that not all choices are created equal:
The leak in the logic is the assumption that choice
is a deliberate, rational function we can apply at
will. But choice is nearly always irrational—which
is only to say that it is executed by the same brain
that gives rise to hope, need, fear, and uncertainty, a
brain that’s highly sensitive to learned associations
and contextual cues, a brain that forges new con-
nections based on the activation of existing con-
nections and the strong emotions they render. [5]
When addressing one of the purported benefits of the
disease model of addiction, i.e. that it frees us from
Bdenigrating addicts for their lack of willpower and
moral decrepitude^ Lewis [18] argues that B[d]espite
the despicable things addicts sometime do, intense
shame and guilt are more likely to thwart recovery than
facilitate it^ [5]. So as a practical matter as well, blaming
addicted persons is not a good way to enable their
recovery [51].
Moral Responsibility - a Key Issue for Moralization
The debate about addiction in terms of compulsion
versus choice has an important impact on whether, or
to what degree, we (should) hold addicted persons mor-
ally responsible for their addictions and for actions
resulting from their addictions. The reasoning seems
simple: For a person to be responsible for her actions,
she has to be in control of them. Following the disease
model, control over one’s addictive behavior is largely
absent, and thus for the most part one cannot be held
responsible for it. On the choice model, however,
addicted persons use the same assessment and volition
mechanisms as non-addicted persons, which would sug-
gest they are largely in control of their actions, and
therefore responsible for their addictive behavior. How-
ever, just as the complex addiction comes in degrees, so
do the different facets related to it such as control and
responsibility [54]. Neither the complex nor the facets
are absolute, but they come on a spectrum. Moreover,
whether one is held responsible for one’s addictive
behavior often also depends on whether one has sought
help and tried to quit.3
Those viewing addiction in terms of choice may have
reasons to consider its negative effects as a matter of
responsibility and blame, although it may only be part of
the explanation for why addictive behavior is frequently
the subject of moral indignation. Notably, the two camps
sketched by now are usually seen as incompatible: If
3 For a closely related discussion see Hannah Pickard in [55].
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addiction is a disease, then there is no place for choice
and self-control. If it is a matter of choice, then the
concerned are to be held responsible for it – with all
the social, legal, and health consequences there are.
A key concept related to moralization is moral re-
sponsibility, along with the accompanying emotions of
guilt, shame, and blame. A widely shared criterion for
moral responsibility is that the agent is not compelled or
that he is free in the relevant sense.
As a behavior or state becomes moralized, we in-
creasingly assume that the individual is morally respon-
sible for finding themselves in that state or the conse-
quences of their behavior or state. There is a vast debate
on moral responsibility and addiction and we will not
cover in any detail here [but see 56–60].We also wish to
further narrow our focus to the choice to continue to
engage in the addictive behavior or consume the addic-
tive substance as the act in question, rather than other
morally problematic acts the addict may perform as a
result of their addiction or the choice to begin using the
substance in the first instance. In this section we high-
light an example of the type of conditions taken to signal
that someone is morally responsible. We add the exam-
ple of the reasons responsiveness view to show that
while the conditions for just this one aspect of moral
responsibility are complex in the absence of the disease
model, they are also complex and difficult to apply
given the disease model.
Sinnott-Armstrong focuses on the diversity among
addicted persons and then asks the question of whether
or not there is a unifying characteristic among them.
That would make us wonder whether or not they are
responsible for their behavior and in what sense they
may not be Bin control^ of their behavior in the way that
non-addicted persons are [54; p.122]. He argues that a
good way to understand control in this context is to
study reasons responsiveness in line with the position
of Fischer and Ravizza [61]. In other words, an agent
has control when, in simplified terms, the agent usually
is receptive to and acts based on the reason he or she has
or the reason he or she believes she has [54; p.130; 62].
On this view different addicted persons are in control
of their behavior to different extents in different circum-
stances, because they are capable of responding to rea-
sons to differing degrees depending on the context, for
example a cocaine addict may not be responsive to her
reasons not to use the drug in social situations in which
she feels uncomfortable [54; p. 135]. Similarly they can
he held morally responsible to various degrees,
depending upon other things, on the extent to which
they were in control of their actions.
Connecting Reasons Responsiveness to Moralization
and Addiction
Lack of control in the form proposed by Sinnott-
Armstrong and Fischer and Ravizza as a lack of reasons
responsiveness cannot tell us definitively whether
addicted persons as a class of persons are responsible
for continuing to use their substance. What is relevant
here is that a deficit in reasons responsiveness can be
realized by multiple different causes, disease being one,
but it also seems likely that the alternative accounts of
addiction given by Flanagan, Lewis, and Levy, may also
involve mechanisms, psychological, social, and neuro-
biological that can diminish reasons-responsiveness. It
thus seems to us that non-disease models of addiction do
not necessarily involve moralization. Notably, for some
there is an explicit effort to avoid this as a consequence
of their theory. While some who endorse alternative
models of addiction also make claims about the moral
responsibility of addicted persons, none of them give an
all or nothing answer. Usually the answer is: to some
extent and in a mitigated way.
Outlook
On first assessment it might seem obvious that a rejec-
tion of the disease model of addiction necessitates a re-
moralization of addiction – a return to blaming, sham-
ing, and perhaps even punishing addicted persons for
their substance seeking and consuming behavior. We
aimed to dissect how different models of addiction
foster or hinder moralization and argued that the diver-
sity of forms of addiction does not allow a one-size-fits
all answer.
Building on accounts of moral responsibility, we
argued that a deficit in reasons responsiveness can be
caused by a disease but also by diverse psychological,
social, and neurobiological mechanisms. Notably, non-
disease models of addiction do not necessarily involve
moralization.
From a normative perspective the entwinement of
addiction and moralization is worrisome for two central
reasons. The first is that moralization and the accompa-
nying stigma persists despite the prevalence of the dis-
ease model of addiction, causing harm to addicted
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persons and society at large. We predict with concerns
that greater embrace of this stigmatization would lead to
even greater harms and steps backward in the social
practices, laws, and public health methods surrounding
addiction. Secondly, moralization itself is an important
phenomenon for normative ethics. In the case of addic-
tion it is closely related to the concept of moral respon-
sibility and may also be for other health conditions that
run the risk of becoming moralized or have been mor-
alized in the past - such as obesity or depression.
Future research on the relationship between models
of addiction and moralization will be further complicat-
ed by the addition of the concept of medicalization. We
wish to investigate the ways in which medicalization
and moralization differ and overlap, both conceptually
and in terms of their recent social trajectories. Relatedly,
stigma is often part of negative moralization, but can
also come along with medicalization. We suggest
looking into the ways in which models of addiction
may exacerbate or reduce stigmatization for certain
groups of addicted persons. Further empirical and con-
ceptual research is needed on the ways in which differ-
ent models of addiction may impact addicted persons’
quality of life and quality of health care, including
public health research. Finally, consideration should be
given to the way the models potentially alter the self-
understanding of addicted persons, relying on phenom-
enological accounts. Ideally, those efforts combined
with raising awareness of the moralization of addiction
ultimately can lead to an approach to recovery in a non-
stigmatizing way.
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